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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for customs enforcement
13 results foundAuthor: Scheyvens, Henry Title: Enhancing Customs Collaboration To Combat The Trade In Illegal Timber Summary: This report builds on the initiatives of the Asia Forest Partnership and East Asia and Pacific FLEG to promote cooperation among Customs, Forestry and other authorities to reduce the trade of illegal wood products. The goal of this review is to assist Customs and timber trade regulating agencies in their efforts to improve control over the international tropical timber trade, thereby preventing trade from being a driver of illegal logging and thus supporting the management, conservation and sustainable development of forests. This study is based on a wide-ranging analytical review of (i) Customs and illegal logging literature, (ii) international legal instruments, (iii) bilateral arrangements that assign or imply a role for Customs in combating the trade of illegal timber, (iv) model and existing agreements for Customs mutual administrative assistance, and (v) existing Customs networks. The review was augmented through consultations including Customs, Forestry and other officials, experts and key stakeholders. Further input was provided through the peer review workshop for this paper, which was held on 28-29 October 2009 in Bangkok. Details: Kanagawa, Japan: Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2010. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2011 at: http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/2784/attach/iges_trade_in_illegal_timber.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/2784/attach/iges_trade_in_illegal_timber.pdf Shelf Number: 120723 Keywords: Customs EnforcementIllegal TimberIllegal TradeOffenses Against the Environment |
Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: Practices and Forms of Cooperation between Customs and Border Guards in the European Union Summary: The economic crisis and the increased threats from terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration have brought to light the issue of efficient and effective management of the external borders of the European Union. For Bulgaria it has become even more important with regard to its upcoming accession to the Schengen area. Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 30: Accessed August 26, 2011 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=15647 Year: 2011 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=15647 Shelf Number: 122562 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (Bulgaria)Customs EnforcementIllegal Immigration |
Author: National Community Advisory Commission Title: Restoring Community: A National Community Advisory Report on ICE's Failed "Secure Communities" Program Summary: The National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLOR) and a National Community Advisory Commission published this report maps out details of how S-Comm (Secure Communities Program) has failed as an immigration policy, doing much more irreversible damage than actually fixing the problem at hand. It includes testimony from law enforcement officials, scholars and academics, and organizers and advocates. Criticizing the ineffective program, the report summarizes S-Comm and highlights the stories of several individuals from across the country who have been victims of S-Comm, facing deportation as a result of simply calling 911 for an emergency, being pulled over while driving or any other arbitrary reason. It multiplies laws and enforcement policies that, in effect, make the pursuit of the American Dream a criminal proposition for current generations of immigrants. That such a program should be the showcase policy of an Administration that presents itself asa champion of immigration reform is a betrayal. Multiplying the force of misguided policy and unjust laws is not reform—it is a step backwards. Details: National Day Laborer Organizing Network, 2011. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2011 at: http://altopolimigra.com/documents/FINAL-Shadow-Report-regular-print.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://altopolimigra.com/documents/FINAL-Shadow-Report-regular-print.pdf Shelf Number: 123497 Keywords: Customs EnforcementIllegal ImmigrationPolice-Community Relations |
Author: Legal Action Center Title: Behind Closed Doors: An Overview of DHS Restrictions on Access to Counsel Summary: While many people have heard of immigration courts, few understand that immigration judges make only a small percentage of the decisions about immigration status. Most determinations are made by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicators, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers, and other government officials empowered to decide an individual’s fate. These decisions might result in lengthy imprisonment and expulsion from the country and often are made without affording the affected individuals access to legal counsel at their own expense. The right to competent legal representation is a constitutional mandate in criminal law. It is also a well‐recognized right in immigration court, although—by contrast with criminal proceedings—the government does not appoint lawyers for indigent noncitizens. Individuals in many types of administrative proceedings before the immigration agencies similarly have a right to legal representation. However, in this obscure world of decision‐making outside the courtroom, the right is often unrecognized or denied. Even when officials provide some access to counsel, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly ICE and CBP, have discouraged or prevented counsel from meaningfully participating in their clients’ cases. The American Immigration Council (Immigration Council), the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), and the Center for Immigrants’ Rights at Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson School of Law began a project over two years ago to uncover the scope of these limitations on access to counsel. Using a variety of tools—including surveys and in‐depth interviews, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and extensive policy and legal analysis—we discovered that limitations on access to counsel were prevalent throughout DHS. Prior to issuing this report, the Immigration Council sought to bring these problems to the attention of the individual agencies. Only USCIS was responsive. In fact, USCIS has made significant revisions to its policies regarding access to counsel in response, at least in part, to the concerns we identified. With respect to ICE and CBP, however, the urgent need for reform remains. Details: Washington, DC: Legal Action Center, American Immigration Council, 2012. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2012 at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Behind_Closed_Doors_5-31-12.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Behind_Closed_Doors_5-31-12.pdf Shelf Number: 125344 Keywords: Criminal Justice ReformCustoms EnforcementDefense Attorneys, AccessImmigrants |
Author: Homeland Security Advisory Council. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Task Force on Secure Communities: Findings and Recommendations Summary: The Task Force on Secure Communities is a subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) and was created in June 2011 at the request of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. HSAC, which is comprised of leaders from state and local government, first responder agencies, the private sector, and academia, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary on matters related to homeland security. The Task Force was asked to consider how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may improve the Secure Communities Program, including how to address some of the concerns about the program that “relate to [its] impact on community policing and the possibility of racial profiling,” and “how to best focus on individuals who pose a true public safety or national security threat.” In addition, the Task Force was specifically charged with making recommendations “on how ICE can adjust the Secure Communities program to mitigate potential impacts on community policing practices, including whether and how to implement policy regarding the removals of individuals charged with, but not convicted of, minor traffic offenses who have no other criminal history.” Under Secure Communities, fingerprints of persons arrested by state and local law enforcement agencies, which those agencies routinely submit to the FBI for criminal justice database checks, are automatically shared with DHS. ICE then checks the local arrestee information against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration databases. If ICE determines that it has an interest in an individual arrestee, the agency then determines what enforcement action to take. In most cases, the people determined to be of interest to ICE are subject to ICE enforcement action for reasons independent of the arrest or conviction. That is, the check of databases may indicate, for example, that the person is removable because he or she entered the country without inspection or overstayed a visa. Specific findings and recommendations are offered within. There is a strong consensus view, within the Task Force and in communities across the nation, that it is appropriate for ICE to continue to take enforcement action against serious criminal offenders who are subject to deportation. But because there are circumstances in which Secure Communities results in the removal of persons who are minor offenders or who have never been convicted of a crime, and because statements by ICE have left much confusion about the full reach of its enforcement priorities, many jurisdictions are concerned about the impact of Secure Communities on community policing. We recommend specific steps on which there is Task Force consensus that would help build trust in the program. Many Task Force members would go further, including recommending suspension of the program until major changes are made, or even recommending termination of what they believe is a fundamentally flawed program. Other members believe that reforms are necessary but the program nonetheless must continue to function. Those differences of view are reflected in the discussion below. ICE must recognize that it does not work in a vacuum and that its enforcement actions impact other agencies and the relationships with their communities in what some may conclude is a negative way. The following pages contain recommendations for ICE to revise the program while working with state and local police, elected officials, and other stakeholders, taking their concerns seriously and working in partnership to find appropriate solutions. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2012 at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf Shelf Number: 126264 Keywords: Background ChecksCommunity PolicingCriminal Aliens (U.S.)Customs EnforcementDeportation |
Author: U.S. Immigration and CustomsEnforcement Title: Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens. Strategic Plan Summary: Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens (Secure Communities) is working with ICE senior leadership and offices, as well as the broader law enforcement community, to better identify criminal aliens, prioritize enforcement actions on those posing the greatest threat to public safety, and transform the entire criminal alien enforcement process. Through improved technology, continual data analysis, and timely information sharing with a broad range of law enforcement agency (LEA) partners, we are helping to protect communities across the country. This document outlines our goals, objectives, and our strategic approach to accomplishing them. Details: Wshington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2009. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2013 at: http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf Shelf Number: 128336 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCriminal AliensCustoms EnforcementHomeland Security (U.S.)Illegal MigrantsImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Title: ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases Summary: Although January is National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month, the month kicked off with a startling report revealing that human traffickers are exploiting the US visa process to smuggle victims into the country. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) data from 2005 to 2014 indicates that work and fiance visas were the predominant means by which more than half of the human traffickers known to federal law enforcement legally smuggled victims into the United States, according to an audit by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (IG). The IG also determined that 274 subjects of ICE human trafficking investigations successfully petitioned USCIS to bring 425 family members and fiances into the United States. ICE could not say exactly how many visa petitioners were human traffickers; however, 18 of the 274 had been arrested for trafficking-related crimes, including sex trafficking, labor trafficking, peonage, and involuntary servitude. The IG's report explained that fiance visas are used to lure human trafficking victims to the US as part of marriage fraud schemes. The traffickers confiscate the victims' passports and often subject them to psychological and physical abuse, such as forced sex and/or forced labor. The auditors determined that ICE and USCIS could improve data quality to better identify instances of human trafficking. Lack of communication between ICE and USCIS also created vulnerabilities in the visa process. "ICE had to extensively manipulate its system to provide us with reasonably reliable data for our data matching and analysis," the report stated. "USCIS did not always collect names and other identifiers of human traffickers that victims had provided in their T visa applications. Due to incomplete data, we were limited in our ability to match, analyze, and draw conclusions from the components' databases." The IG made three recommendations: Recommendation 1: Develop and implement procedures to capture the names and other identifying information on human traffickers found in victims' statements, which are submitted with T and U petitions, in USCIS information systems. Recommendation 2: Collaborate with ICE to institute a mutually acceptable procedure for transferring USCIS data on alleged human traffickers to ICE. Recommendation 3: Collaborate with USCIS to identify a mutually acceptable procedure for obtaining names and other identifying information on alleged human traffickers that is available in USCIS systems. ICE and USCIS concurred, saying they would address the IG's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: OIG-16-17: Accessed January 25, 2016 at: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-17-Jan16.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-17-Jan16.pdf Shelf Number: 137658 Keywords: Customs EnforcementForced LaborHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingImmigration EnforcementLabor TraffickingSex Trafficking |
Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Families in Fear: The Atlanta Immigration Raids Summary: This report features stories from women swept up in the Immigration and Customs Enforcement raids that began on Jan. 2, 2016. The report by the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights found that the federal government has engaged in a needlessly aggressive - and potentially unconstitutional - act against immigrants with these home raids that targeted women and children from Central America. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/splc_families_in_fear_ice_raids_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/splc_families_in_fear_ice_raids_3.pdf Shelf Number: 137803 Keywords: Customs EnforcementImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Sex Offenders: ICE Could Better Inform offenders It Supervises of Registration Responsibilities and Notify Jurisdictions when Offenders Are Removed Summary: On the basis of GAO's analysis of a representative sample of 131 alien sex offenders under U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) supervision, GAO estimates that as of September 2012, 72 percent of alien sex offenders were registered, 22 percent were not required to register, and 5 percent did not register but should have. According to officials, offenders were not required to register for various reasons, such as the offense not requiring registration in some states. Of the 6 offenders in GAO's sample that should have registered, officials from ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (ICE-ERO) field offices informed 4 of their registration requirements. However, officials at some of these field offices identified several reasons why they did not ensure that these offenders actually registered. For example, the offender may have moved and no longer resided in the area of responsibility for that particular field office. ICE had not informed the remaining 2 offenders of their registration requirements. Alien sex offenders are not consistently informed of potential registration requirements, and relevant jurisdiction officials--that is, state, territorial, and tribal sex offender registry and law enforcement officials--are not consistently notified when an offender is removed from the country or released. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 2006 (SORNA) and other federal laws identify when sex offenders and relevant jurisdiction officials should be notified. However, the agencies that have these notification responsibilities are limited in their ability to provide information to and about alien sex offenders, in part because they do not know when ICE-ERO will release or remove these offenders. ICE-ERO has a procedure in place to inform alien sex offenders who are being removed about potential registration requirements, but not alien sex offenders who are being released into the community under supervision, primarily because ICE-ERO is uncertain whether it has a responsibility to do so. ICE-ERO also does not consistently notify relevant jurisdiction officials when an alien sex offender is removed or released under supervision, for similar reasons. However, officials from the Department of Justice's Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART) Office said that state correctional facilities, in the interest of public safety, have notification processes in place, even though sometimes not required to do so. ICE-ERO is reviewing options for informing alien sex offenders under supervision about their potential registration requirements and notifying jurisdictions when alien sex offenders are released under supervision, but has not established a deadline for completing its review, which is inconsistent with project management standards. Without a deadline, it will be difficult to hold ICE-ERO accountable for providing these notifications. Further, ICE-ERO does not plan to notify relevant jurisdictions when an alien sex offender is removed. Providing such notification could help jurisdictions ensure public safety and avoid unnecessarily spending resources trying to locate the offender. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-832: Accessed August 5, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657831.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657831.pdf Shelf Number: 130035 Keywords: Customs EnforcementIllegal Immigrants Sex Offender Registration Sex Offenders |
Author: Australia. Auditor General Title: The Australian Border Force's Use of Statutory Powers Summary: Background 1. On 9 May 2014, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection announced the government's decision to bring together the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Immigration) and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs) in a single department from 1 July 2015. Within the integrated department, the government established the Australian Border Force (Border Force) as a 'single frontline operational border agency to enforce our customs and immigration laws and protect our border'. 2. Both the Customs Act 1901 (Customs Act) and Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) contain a wide range of powers. While many of these are essentially administrative in nature, there are a wide range of coercive powers - such as powers to question, search, detain or arrest people, or enter and search vehicles or premises - which departmental officers, such as Border Force officers, can now exercise. Other Acts (such as the Maritime Powers Act 2013) also confer powers on officers. In total, officers can exercise coercive powers under 35 Acts and more than 500 empowering provisions. Audit objective and criteria 3. The objective of the audit was to assess the establishment and administration of the Australian Border Force's framework to ensure the lawful exercise of powers in accordance with applicable legislation. 4. To form a conclusion against the audit objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level audit criteria: Is there an effective accountability and reporting framework for the lawful exercise of powers? Do Border Force officers have adequate knowledge of their powers and how to use them? Conclusion 5. As part of the integration of Immigration and Customs, the department has made progress towards establishing a framework to ensure Border Force officers exercise coercive powers lawfully and appropriately. However, significantly more work needs to be done to gain assurance that controls are effective. 6. The department's enterprise risk management framework does not adequately address the risk of officers exercising coercive powers unlawfully or inappropriately. Several internal assurance reviews have uncovered problems relating to the exercise of statutory powers. The Border Force has established an integrated operational quality assurance team, which has not yet finalised any reports. Delegations and authorisations for coercive powers are complete and in place but not all instruments are accessible to officers. 7. The ANAO found instances of potentially unlawful searches and failure to comply with instructions under both the Customs Act and Migration Act, which indicate current internal controls for mitigating the risk of unlawful or inappropriate use of coercive powers are inadequate. 8. The department has not provided adequate instructions and guidance for officers exercising coercive powers. There is currently no single source of instructions and guidance material for Border Force officers, and much of the guidance material available is out of date and inaccurate. While positive foundational work has commenced on integrating the former Customs and Immigration training regimes, officers have been exercising significant coercive powers without having undertaken pre-requisite training. Supporting findings 9. The department's approach to risk management at the enterprise level has been developing over the past two years. It has established an enterprise risk framework and is finalising profiles for each of its enterprise risks. The current profile relating to unlawful or inappropriate use of coercive powers conflates this risk with integrity and corruption risks, which require different internal controls. This has the potential to divert attention from controls relating to the risk of unlawful or inappropriate use of coercive powers. 10. The department has undertaken several internal assurance reviews that have uncovered problems relating to the exercise of statutory powers. The Border Force has recently established an integrated team responsible for operational quality assurance testing. The team has not yet completed any reviews. Prior to this, the department did not have satisfactory mechanisms for gaining assurance that officers understand their powers and are exercising them lawfully. 11. Instruments of authorisation and delegation for coercive Migration and Customs Act powers are complete and up-to-date. While Migration Act instruments of authorisation and delegation are available on the intranet, instruments relating to the Customs Act (and other Acts) are not accessible to officers. 12. Some personal searches of passengers at international airports examined by the ANAO were unlawful or inappropriate, indicating weaknesses in the control framework. A number of searches of premises under the Migration Act potentially exceeded the authority of the warrant which authorised them, and officers routinely questioned people without documenting their legal authority to do so. Officers also frequently failed to comply with departmental policy instructions, including compliance with certification and recordkeeping requirements. 13. The department has commenced a project to identify the statutory powers of officers of the integrated department, with a longer term view to possibly amending some powers. As part of the project, in July 2016, the department completed a consolidated inventory of all powers available to departmental officers under Commonwealth legislation. Such an inventory will enable the department to identify overlap, duplication, redundancy and inconsistency within and between Acts. It will also assist with identifying any gaps or deficiencies in powers in order to be able to submit a proposal for potential legislative change for government consideration. 14. The Border Force is developing a coordinated systematic framework for reporting on its use of coercive powers. It presently does not have such a framework. 15. Many of the instructions that are provided to Border Force officers on the department's intranet are out of date, incomplete, inaccurate and are not accessible to all officers. A project to remedy this situation was endorsed by the department's executive in December 2015 and has to date delivered only a very small number of operational instructions for Border Force officers. 16. The department has made progress in integrating the former Customs and Immigration training regimes and addressing deficiencies identified through pre-integration training audits conducted in 2014. The establishment of an integrated Learning and Development Branch and the Border Force College has been managed as a priority project, under the Reform and Integration Taskforce. While this project has delivered solid foundations for enhancing the learning maturity of the department, at the time of examination the results of these foundational efforts had yet to be realised. 17. Not all officers exercising coercive powers under the Migration Act and Customs Act have received pre-requisite training. The department has established an integrated Learning Management System but issues remain in relation to the completeness of training records. 18. The department has been undertaking a project to transition to a new workforce model, which has involved establishing 'vocations', profiling job roles under each vocation, mapping required competencies, and developing high level curricula. Training needs analysis for the Border Force vocational stream commenced in October 2016. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian National Audit Office, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 7, 2017 at: https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017_39.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017_39.pdf Shelf Number: 146415 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCustoms EnforcementIllegal ImmigrationImmigrantsImmigration EnforcementUse of Force |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General Title: ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions Summary: Why We Did This Review - U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) oversees the segregation of detainees from detention facilities' general population. In this review of seven detention facilities, we sought to determine whether, for detainees with mental health conditions: (1) facility personnel follow ICE guidance for documenting segregation decisions; (2) facilities report segregation data accurately and promptly; and (3) ICE field offices follow procedures for reviewing segregation. What We Recommend - We are making three recommendations to ICE to improve oversight and accountability for segregation of detainees with mental health conditions. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: OIG-17-119: Accessed October 16, 2017 at: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-119-Sep17.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-119-Sep17.pdf Shelf Number: 147687 Keywords: Customs EnforcementImmigrant Detention Immigration Enforcement Mental Health Services |
Author: Bier, David J. Title: U.S. Citizens Targeted by ICE: U.S. Citizens Targeted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Texas Summary: Texas law SB 4 imposes jail time on local police who fail to detain anyone whom federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) requests. Data from Travis County, Texas, show that ICE targets large numbers of U.S. citizens. From October 2005 to August 2017, 814 targets of ICE detainers in Travis County-3.3 percent of all requests-claimed U.S. citizenship and presented officers with a Social Security number (SSN). ICE subsequently canceled or declined to execute about a quarter of those detainer requests. Based on statements from ICE officials, the best explanation for not executing these detainers is that ICE targeted at least 228 U.S. citizens in the county before canceling or declining to execute those detainers. SB 4 will likely increase the detention of U.S. citizens for supposed violations of immigration law by preventing local police from releasing them. Applying the rate of wrongful detainers in Travis County to all detainers in the state of Texas from 2006 to 2017 implies that ICE wrongfully placed detainers on at least 3,506 U.S. citizens statewide. Other evidence shows that ICE regularly releases U.S. citizens after it executes a detainer, meaning that the true number of U.S. citizens initially targeted is likely even higher than that estimate. The fact that ICE often discovers its own mistakes only mitigates the harm inflicted on U.S. citizens wrongfully detained under the suspicion that they are illegal immigrants-and does not protect these jurisdictions from lawsuits under SB 4. Local law enforcement in Texas needs the flexibility to sort through these citizenship claims without the threat of jail time imposed by SB 4. Details: Washington, CA: CATO Institute, 2018. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-8.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-8.pdf Shelf Number: 151327 Keywords: Customs EnforcementIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigration and Customs EnforcementImmigration Policy |
Author: Hing, Bill Ong Title: Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration Enforcement Regime Summary: During the early stages of the Trump ICE age, we seem to be witnessing and experiencing an unparalleled era of immigration enforcement. But is it unparalleled? Didn't we label Barack Obama the "Deporter-in-Chief?" Wasn't it George Bush who used the authority of the Patriot Act to round up nonimmigrants from Muslim and Arab countries and didn't his ICE commonly engage in armed raids a factories and other worksites? Aren't there strong parallels that can be drawn between Trump enforcement plans and actions and those of other eras? What about the fear and hysteria that seems to really be happening in immigrant communities? Is the fear unparalleled? Why is there so much fear? Is the fear justified? Why do things seem different, in spite of rigorous immigration enforcement that has occurred even in recent years? This article begins with a comparison of what the Trump administration has done in terms of immigration enforcement with the enforcement efforts of other administrations. For example, I compare (1) the attempted Muslim travel bans with post-9/11 efforts by George W. Bush and Iranian student roundups by Jimmy Carter, (2) the Border Wall proposal with the Fence Act of 2006 and Operation Gatekeeper in 1994, (3) restarting Secure Communities (fingerprint sharing program) with Obama's enforcement program of the same name, (4) expanding INA S 287(g) agreements with Bush efforts under the same statute, (5) the threat of raids by an ICE deportation army with Bush gun-toting raids, (6) extreme vetting of immigrants and refugees with what already existed under Bush and Obama, (7) threatening to cut off federal funds to sanctuary cities with the prosecution of sanctuary workers in the 1980s, (8) prioritizing "criminal" immigrants with Obama's similar prioritization, and (9) expedited removal in the interior with Bush and Obama expedited removals along the border. Then I turn to the fear and hysteria in immigrant communities that has spread throughout the country. I ask why that fear has occurred and whether the fear has a reasonable basis. I close with a personal reflection on the parallels I have seen and experienced since I began practicing immigration law as a legal services attorney in 1975 and contemplate why enforcement and the resulting fear are different today. Details: California, 2017. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3032662 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: file:///C:/Users/AuthUser/Downloads/SSRN-id3032662.pdf Shelf Number: 151533 Keywords: Customs EnforcementImmigrants and CrimeImmigrationImmigration EnforcementImmigration PolicySanctuary Cities |